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Two of the malware analysts in my lab have been complaining to me that the malware they see everyday is getting boring - the primary attacks that we see in the largest volume are the same thing over and over and over again.
Let's be thankful for that! The big news in the malware world yesterday came when Microsoft announced a work around for Duqu, named by researchers in the CrySyS Lab (the Laboratory for Cryptography and System Security at Budapest University of Technology and Economics) because it prefixes some created filenames with the letters "~DQ".
On October 14, 2011, CrySyS contacted Symantec to get some help analyzing the malware, and Symantec released an extremely informative 67 page PDF report called W32.Duqu: The Precursor to the next Stuxnet. (The link is to version 1.3 of the report, updated on November 1, 2011).
There have been two IP addresses confirmed to be associated with Duqu and serving as Command & Control. The first IP was in India - 206.183.111.97. The second was in Hungary - 77.241.93.160. Traffic flow to either of these IP addresses would be a strong positive indicator of a Duqu infection! Both sites are down now.
The first server was announced to be down on October 31st in stories such as this one -- India Shuts Server Linked to Duqu Computer Virus that shares some details of a server located at 200 employee data center Web Werks.
The second server was at Combell in Belgium -- as described in stories such as this one -- Duqu Hackers Shift to Belgium After India Raid.
Duqu is a data stealing program that shares several blocks of code with Stuxnet. In fact, one of the two pieces of malware we've seen that is described as being Duqu is also detected as Stuxnet by some AV vendors.
Here's a VirusTotal report of the better detected of those pieces of code, which had the MD5 value e1e00c2d5815e4129d8ac503f6fac095. This file is not "Duqu" but is rather "an .exe file related to Duqu" which is a much larger program (this one is only 9k in size).
(Click for VirusTotal Report)
Non "generic" definitions for this malware included:
Avast: Win32:Duqu-F
Emsisoft: Trojan.Win32.Stuxnet!IK
Ikarus: Trojan.Win32.Stuxnet
Microsoft: Trojan:Win32/Duqu.E
NOD32: probably a variant of Win32/Duqu.A
TrendMicro: TROJ_DUQU.AJ
Symantec mentioned MD5s
9749d38ae9b9ddd81b50aad679ee87ec
Wed Jun 01, 03:25:18 2011
Stealing information
4c804ef67168e90da2c3da58b60c3d16
Mon Oct 17 17:07:47 2011
Reconnaissance module
856a13fcae0407d83499fc9c3dd791ba
Mon Oct 17 16:26:09 2011
Lifespan extender
92aa68425401ffedcfba4235584ad487
Tue Aug 09 21:37:39 2011
Stealing information
In each of those above, the link on the MD5 will show you the VirusTotal report. I find it interesting that TrendMicro consistently names these files "TROJ_SHADOW.AG" which makes me wonder if they had independently discovered this malware family prior to the naming as Duqu by the CrySyS team.
Symantec calls attention to the fact that several of these files show compile dates AFTER the public disclosure of the existence of Duqu.
Delivery Mechanism
Symantec disclosed in their report that one of the infections they were analyzing had been infected via a Word Document that exploited the system using a previously unknown 0-day attack.
We now know from Microsoft more about this exploit. On November 3, 2011, Microsoft released this Microsoft Security Advisory (2639658)
Vulnerability in TrueType Font Parsing Could Allow Elevation of Privilege. The advisory starts with an executive summary which says, in part:
Microsoft is investigating a vulnerability in a Microsoft Windows component, the Win32k TrueType font parsing engine. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code in kernel mode. The attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. We are aware of targeted attacks that try to use the reported vulnerability; overall, we see low customer impact at this time. This vulnerability is related to the Duqu malware.
Microsoft has released a work around. The exploit is taking advantage of the fact that there is a problem in one of the DLL's called by TrueType in certain circumstances. If a system denies access to that .DLL, T2EMBED.DLL, then the exploit would fail to work.
The workaround can be executed like this, but Microsoft cautions that applications that rely on EMBEDDED TrueType fonts could then fail to display properly:
(For older Windows versions)
Echo y| cacls "%windir%\system32\t2embed.dll" /E /P everyone:N
(For newer Windows versions)
Takeown.exe /f "%windir%\system32\t2embed.dll"
For more details on the workaround, please see Microsoft Security Advisory: Vulnerability in TrueType font parsing could allow elevation of privileges which offers a "Fix It For Me" button to apply the work around for you.
Duqu Compared to Stuxnet
The Symantec report has 22 or so pages of original Symantec content, and then has as the majority of it's body the report by the CrySyS Lab, which has a section that compares the Duqu and Stuxnet code. In particular, the Decryption function seems to be nearly identical.
